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MISSOURI SECTION
COMMENTS
CRIMINAL LAw-CoNDITIONAL INTENT AS SATisrnw Ssm'IC
INTENT REQUIREMENT FOR AGGRAVAT ASSAULT
State v. Cheotin, 284 S.W2d 5647 (Mo. 1955)
Defendant, an official of a local union, became involved in an argu-
ment in his office with members of the union's board of trustees.1
After leaving the room and returning with ten or twelve men, de-
fendant produced a gun and stated, "Start something and I will blow
your - - guts all over the wall." He then forced the members
of the board from his office and, while continuing his threats, fol
lowed them to the street door. Defendant was convicted of assault
with intent to kill or do great bodily harm.2 Although reversing on
other grounds,, the Supreme Court of Missouri stated that the specific
intent requirement for assault with intent to kill or do great bodily
harm was satisfied if the jury reasonably could have found that the
threatened act would have been executed if the condition of leaving
the building had not been met.
A conditional intent is the intention that one's conduct will be gov-
erned by the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a future event. In assault
cases such an intent is manifested by menacing acts accompanied by
a conditional threat that physical harm will result unless the threat-
ened person acts, or refrains from acting, in a specified manner.'
Since the connission of an aggravated assault requires a specific in-
tent, the issue presented by the principal case is whether a conditional
intent to use an unlawful amount of force, fulfills this intent require-
I. The local had been placed in "trusteeship" by the international organization.
2. Io. ERv. STAT. § 559.190 (1949) provides: "Every person who shall be con-
victed of an assault with intent to kill, or do great bodily harm, or to commit any
robbery, rape, burglary, manslaughter or other felony., shall be punished .... "
3. The convition was reversed because the trial judge had refused to give a
requested instruction to the effect that the jury could not convict even if they
found that the defendant had committed a common assault. State v. Chevlin,
284 SW.2d 563, 567 (Mo. 1955). The information charging the assault was not
filed until more than one year after the incident occurred, and therefore a con-
viction for common assault was barred by the statute of limitations. Me. RFv.
STAT. § 559.200, 556.040, 541.200 (1949).
4. A different situation exists where the threat of violence is negatived by
making it conditional on an existing fact. No assault is committed under such
circumstances. State v. Crow, 23 N.C. 375 (1841) ("Were you not an old man
I would knock you down."). See CLARK & MRM aIA, Cnnaxrs 270 (5th ed. 1952).
5. Stroud v. State, 131 Miss. 875, 95 So. 738 (1923); CRK & AU snAn. op.
cit. ,tnpra note 4, at 274; Perkins, Criminal Attempt and Related Probtems, 2
UC.L.A.L. R V. 319, 346 (1955).
6. One who makes a conditional threat may be in one of four legal positions.
He "may be (1) privileged to carry out his threat if disobeyed; (2) privileged
to make the threat as a bluff but not to carry it out; (3) entitled to impose the
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ment where the condition is performed subsequently to the threat but
before the cessation of the menacing acts.7
While very few cases have arisen in this area, there are three
possible views as to whether a conditional intent satisfies the specific
intent requirement of aggravated assault: (1) a specific intent exists
if the condition is unlawful, but not if it is lawful; (2) a conditional
intent can never satisfy the specific intent requirement; (3) a condi-
tional intent may constitute a specific intent.
(1) In Hairston v. State8 defendant threatened to shoot a tres-
passer unless he discontinued the trespass.9 Although the condition was
one which could be lawfully demanded by defendant, it was accom-
panied by a threat to use an excessive amount of force to compel
performance of the condition. 0 The Supreme Court of Mississippi
held that although defendant was guilty of common assault he could
not be convicted of assault with intent to murder since an intent to
kill would not be inferred from the fact that a gun was aimed at the
threatened party within shooting distance." In contrast to the
Hairston case, People v. Connors 2 was concerned with a threat to kill
accompanied by an unlawful condition. 13 In the Connors case, the
Supreme Court of Illinois held that although the intent was conditional
defendant could be convicted of assault with intent to murder.14 Peo-
condition but not to make such a threat; or (4) not entitled to impose the condi-
tion." Perkins, supra note 5, at 346. It is only in the last three situations that a
specific intent problem may arise.
7. A problem of conditional intent does not arise where the condition has not
been performed inasmuch as it appears that if the menacing acts are voluntarily
discontinued, the mere existence of a conditional threat accompanied by such acts
is not in and of itself sufficient to establish a conditional intent. See Smith v.
State, 39 Miss. 521 (1860); Price v. State, 168 Tenn. 378, 79 S.W.2d 283 (1935).
Thus, where a conditional threat is made and the party who is threatened fails
to perform the condition, the specific intent required for an aggravated assault
cannot be established unless the person who made the threat does other acts
which would indicate an unconditional intent. Comp~are cases cited supra, with
Beal v. State, 203 Md. 380, 101 A.2d 233 (1953) (Defendant fired a gun into a
house after making a conditional threat.); Smith v. State, 49 So. 2d 244 (Miss.
1950) (defendant beat person threatened).
8. 54 Miss. 689 (1877).
9. Id. at 693. While defendant was helping to remove property of another
from the latter's place of former employment, the complaining witness placed his
hands on defendant's mules in an attempt to stop him from removing the property.
10. Defendant had drawn a pistol and while pointing it at the person threat-
ened stated: "I came here to move Charles Johnston, and by G-d I am going to
do it, and I will shoot any G-d d-d man who attempts to stop my mules." Id.
at 692.
11. Id. at 693-94. Contra, State v. Epperson, 27 Mo. 255 (1858).
12. 253 Ill. 266, 97 N.E. 643 (1912).
13. Defendant had threatened to kill a man unless he would take off his
overalls and quit work.
14. The court pointed out that an unlawful condition, similar to an impossible
condition, would not be considered as a mitigating factor in determining criminal
liability. It was indicated that where one does not have the right to demand
performance of the condition, there is a presumption that the person making the
threat knows that the condition will not be performed. Hence, an unlawful con-
dition is no condition. 253 Ill. at 280, 97 N.E. at 648.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss4/6
MISSOURI SECTION
pM a. Coanoos distinguished the facts of Hcrstw v. Stat on- the
ground that the latter case involved a lawful condition, If these two
cases are read in juxtaposition, one might conceivably conclude ttt
in aggravated assault cases where a conditional intent exists and the
required condition has been performed, criminal liability is determined
4y the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the conditiom It is submitted,
Iuwever, that the Connors case cannot be considered authority, for this
proposition, inasmuch as the court relied on cases which actually
involved lawful conditions but in which defendants were nevertheless
held guilty of aggravated assault."- In fact, no case has been found
where the specific intent requirement for aggravated assault was made
to depend upon the lawfulness of the condition."
(2) Subsequent to the Habstatn and Connors decisions, the Missis-
sippi court was faced with the problem whether a conditional intent
hased on an unlawful condition would meet the specific intent require-
ment for aggravated assault and held that, regardless of the lawful-
ness of the condition, the existence of a conditional intent cannot sat-
usfy the specific intent requirementr The court reasoned that a spe
vuic intent is not formed when one conditions his acts upon the hap-
v mng of an event which may or may not occur since at that time
there is a possibility that the condition will be met,
(3) All other jurisdictions which have considered the problem have
heid that a conditional intent may satify the specific intent require-
mnat regardless of whether the condition is lawful or unlawful."
These jurisdiction would allow a jury to find the accused guilty of
aggravated assault if they find that the threatened act would have
been executed were the condition not metr This view has been based
upon treatment of performance of the condition as the equivalent of
i;," See "A CJ. Li rnch § 159 (2>) (a> (M),2>
I,6. The followirg cases which involved lawful conditions were cited in
C-nk' att State v, Mforga 215 NC, 186 (1842) (threat to prevent a t );
State v, Doley, 121 Mo. 591, 26 S.W.2d 558 (1824) ii-n> (threat to recover
pe ,'Yenal reoperty). Although the reasoning of the court In Connors was based
(m the fact that the cond tion was unlawful, the court does not make it clear
what As position would have Ten if the condition were lawful See note 14 sara
17. The foll ving are case from the only Jurisdictions which have considered
the condi t ional inent problem in aggravated assault casm Stroud v. State, la1
Ms5 87F, 05 So. 78 (19 ); State v. Morgan, 25 N,.C 186 (1842>; Tbhom v.
State, U7 Tex. Crin 44 26 SW, 20 (1896); State . Dooley, 5126
S.W, 558 (1894) (diu). 5b
18, Stroud v, State 121 MIss. 875, 95 So, 738 (122); Craddock v, State, 204
Miss. 606, 57 US. 2d 7 8 (1R48).
19f State v, Morgan 25 N.C. 186 (1842); Thomon v. Stat Tm r
448. 56 SA;G 26 (M); State v. Dooley, 121 Mo. 521, 26 S.W. M (I84) (dic
turnl. See also Wi, STAT.§ 24220(125)>
20, Cases cited note 12 spra. State v. Fine, 224 Mo, 194, 22 S.W2d 7 (12)
(dictum), The fact that the menacing acts are cotiued until the conditio is
performed is sufficient evidence for the jury to find that a conditional Intent
existed, ARth; ef. State v. Epperson, 27 Mo. 255 (88).
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an intervening circumstance under the law of criminal attempts ;il
where the consummation of a criminal attempt is prevented by an in-
tervening circumstance, criminal liability may be predicated upon a
finding by the jury that the crime would have been completed in the
absence of the intervening circumstance. 22 Thus, under this view, con-
sidering the performance of the condition as an intervening circum-
stance, it is reasoned that the specific intent required for an aggra-
vated assault may be found to exist even though the intent was con-
ditional.23
The first view, while never having been adopted by a court,2' could
be based upon the argument that one who conditionally intends to use
an excessive amount of force to accomplish that which he may law-
fully demand should not be punished as severely as one who condi-
tionally intends to use the same amount of force to accomplish an
unlawful end. It should be noted, however, that the presence of a
lawful condition will not lessen the degree of criminal liability if a
failure to perform the condition is met with the use of an excessive
amount of force. 25 For example, if one carries out a conditional threat
to kill because the condition was not performed, the actor would be
guilty of murder regardless of the lawfulness of the condition.26 There-
fore, if any criminal liability is to be imposed where the condition has
been performed, it is submitted that the degree of liability should be
the same regardless of the lawfulness of the condition.
There can be no doubt that one who makes a conditional threat and
who has a concurrent conditional intent to use an excessive amount
of force to secure performance of the condition should be punished in
some way. It is submitted, however, that where the condition is per-
formed and there has been no physical violence it would be erroneous
to convict for aggravated assault. The intent necessary for the crime
of attempt is a present desire27 to accomplish the crime asserted to
have been attempted.2 8 Thus, since an aggravated assault is an at-
21. State v. Dooley, 121 Mo. 591, 26 S.W. 558 (1894) (dictum).
22. People v. Miller, 2 Cal. 2d 527, 42 P.2d 308 (1935); CLARK & MARSHALL,
CRIMES 175 (5th ed. 1952).
23. Query, should performance of a condition which one would prefer to happen
in order to avoid resorting to violence to gain compliance with a stated condition
be considered an extrinsic act and a device upon which to predicate a finding
of specific intent?
24. But compare People v. Connors, 253 Ill. 266, 97 N.E. 643 (1912) (semble).
25. Stacey v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 402, 225 S.W. 37 (1920).
26. Ibid. Defendant threatened to shoot if a trespass were not discontinued,
and there being no compliance with the condition he killed the party threatened.
Held, the trespass would not mitigate liability for murder.
27. See note 30 infra.
28. Lee v. Commonwealth, 144 Va. 594, 131 S.E. 212 (1926) ; Perkins, Criminal
Attempt and Related Problems, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 319, 340 (1955). See MARKBY,
ELEMFENTS or LAW § 220 (5th ed. 1896); SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 378-81 (10th
ed. 1947).
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tempted battery2 the specific intent required for aggravated assault
is a present desire to consummate a battery. But in the conditional in-
tent situation, the primary objective of the person making the threat
is to secure performance of a condition. This objective is manifested
by his forbearing to consummate the battery in order to give the
threatened party an opportunity to perform the condition and by non-
execution of the battery when the condition is performed. This delay,
when considered in the light of the objective, indicates that during the
time allowed for performance of the condition there is no present de-
sire to commit a felonious battery and therefore no specific intent0
Thus, it is submitted that the third view, adopted in the principal
case, which would allow the imposition of punishment for aggravated
assault, is erroneous inasmuch as conditional intent does not satisfy
the specific intent requirement. It would further appear that the
second view, which would allow a conviction for commonl but not for
aggravated assault, is the correct and more logical doctrine.
EVIDENCE-EX iRAJUDICIAL CONnSSION INADMISSIBLE WITHOUT
CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH CoRPUs DELICTI
St. Loids v. Waters, 289 S.W.2d 444 (Mo. App. 1956)
Defendant, after reporting to the police that he had been robbed,
confessed extrajudicially that the report was false and that he had
used the money which was said to have been stolen to pay bills. His
conviction of violating a city ordinance, which makes it a misdemeanor
to knowingly submit a false report of a law violation to a police officer
of the city,1 was based on his uncorroborated confession. In reversing
the conviction, the court of appeals held that since the corpus delicti
had not been established the confession could not be introduced as
evidence of guilt.2
29. State v. Morgan, 25 N.C. 186 (1842); Perkins, auprw, note 28, at 344.
'it. Intent has been defined more broadly than a desire to, accomplish a certain
result, For example, it has been said that advertence to a consequence Which wil
necessarily result from an act may also constitute intent. Cook, Act, Intention and
Mo fCe in the Criminal Law, 26 YAW L.. 645, 657-58 (1917). It is Submitted,
however, that the preceding analysis is in no way affected by the morebroadly stated definition. When an actor is waiting to ascertain whether his
demanded condition will he performed he surely can have no present advertence
to conseuences of an act for the simple reason that he has not yet acted.
311, It is to be noted in this regard that logical consistency would allow con-
viction for common assault only in those states where the unlawful placing of
another in apprehension constitutes that crime, see CLARK & MARSHALL, Cmzs
268-69 (5th ed. 1952). in those states where an actual intention on the part of
the actor to commit a battery is required for common assault, ibid., it would
appear that an adoption of the analysi suggested in this comment would logically
require that a conditional intent he held not to satisfy even the intent requirement
for common assault,
1, Sr. Louis RLv. Cons c- 46, § 23 (1948).
2. St. Louis v. Watters, 289 S.W.2d 444 (Mo. App. 1958).
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